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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARINDA DAY,

Plaintiff-AP pellant
PETITION

FOR

vs.

REHEARING

LORENZO SMITH & SON, INC., a
Utah corporation,

Case No.
10256

Defendant-Respondent

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., a Utah corporation, defendant and respondent herein respectfully petitions this
Honorable Court for a rehearing and reargument in the
above entitled case. The petition is based upon the following grounds:

POINT I.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO PATROLMAN SHERWOOD'S TESTIMONY ON THE
GROUND NO PROPER FOUNDATION HAD BEEN
LAID SO THE OBJECTION TO "ANY OPINION"
WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED.

I

iI

l

/

..._ j

2

POINT II.
THE PATROLMAN'S TESTIMONY ON POINT
OF IMPACT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
POINT Ill.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THERE
WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT
THE TESTIMONY OF PATROLMAN SHERWOOD.
WHEREFORE, the defendant and respondent, petitioner herein, prays that the judgment and opinion of
the court be re-examined and a reargument permitted of
the entire case.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
Attorneys for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I, Stephen B. Nebeker, one of the attorneys for the
defendant and respondent, do hereby certify that I have
carefully examined and considered the foregoing petition
for rehearing, know the contents thereof, and that in my
opinion the same is well founded in point of law and is
not made for the mere purpose of delaying the determination of said cause.
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO PATROLMAN SHERWOOD'S TESTIMONY ON THE
GROUND NO PROPER FOUNDATION HAD BEEN
LAID SO THE OBJECTION TO "ANY OPINION"
WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED.
In the original opinion handed down by this court
it was held that a trial judge, in his discretion, may permit
a qualified expert to give his opinion as to the point of
the collision when a proper foundation for the opinion
has been laid.
When the patrolman was asked where the point of
impact was, he testifed:
A. "It was near the center line and my best opinion,
it may have been-"
Plaintiff's attorney objected to the answer as follows:
"I will object to any opinion your Honor." (Italics
ours)
The objection made by plaintiff's attorney was a
specific objection to "any opinion." Plaintiff's attorney
did not object to the testimony on the ground no proper
foundation had been laid.
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by
overruling the objection to "any opinion," because plain-
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tiff's attorney failed to object on the ground a proper
foundation had not been laid.
It is well settled that an objection to be good, must
point out the specific ground of the objection, and if it
does not do so, no error is committed in overruling it. A
party is confined to the specific objections made by him
and can have the benefit of no others. 53 Am. Jur. Sec.
137.

In 88 C.J.S. Trial Sec. 125 (b) the rule is stated as
follows:
"It is a rule of universal application that the
objection is deemed to be limited to the ground or
grounds specified and does not cover others not
specified. In other words, where specific grounds
are stated the implication is that there are no others,
or, if others, that they are waived. A specific objection overruled will be effective to the extent of
the grounds specified, and no further."
In Wigmore's work on evidence, Vol. I, Sec. 18
(Third Edition) the following rule is enunciated:
"A specific objection overruled will be effective to the extent of the grounds specified and no
further. An objection overruled, therefore naming

a ground which is untenable cannot be availed of
because there was another and tenable ground
which might have been named but was not."
(Italics ours)

It is the duty of the objecting attorney to point out
to the court and opposing counsel why the proffered testimony is improper.
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It is only fair that the trial judge should have an
opportunity to pass upon the precise question involved,
and that the nature of the objection should be pointed
out. Furthermore, opposing counsel should have an opportunity to remove the objection or supply the defect
by other testimony.
Where evidence has been objected to as inadmissible
for certain specified reasons, the objection will be deemed
to be limited to the grounds which have been specified.
Jones on Evidence Fifth Edition Sec. 976.
This court has previously held that an appellant is
entitled to a review of testimony admitted over his objection only on the grounds stated in the objection. In
Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80 Utah 587, 16 P.
2d 212, (1932) an action was brought to determine the
title and ownership of two savings accounts. At the trial,
appellant made an objection to testimony on the ground
it was "irrelevent and immaterial self serving declarations
on the part of the deceased." The objection was overruled. On appeal appellant claimed for the first time
that the testimony was incompetent under the provisions
of the dead man statute. This court held:
"The objection being overruled, the appellant
is entitled to a review of the ruling only upon the
grounds stated and pointed out by his objection,
which were irrelevancy and immateriality and "self
serving statements on the part of the deceased."
The objection was properly overruled, for the proffered evidence was both relevant and material.
* * * Though we assume the witness because of her
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interest to be incompetent by reason of the statute
to testify in this case, yet, under the state of the
record we are satisfied that question is not before
us. The question not having been raised in the trial

court, we do not feel at liberty to pass on the question now argued by appellant in this court for the
first time." (Italics ours)

The following cases support the rule that a specific
objection overruled will be effective to the extent of the
grounds specified and no further. Eggermont v. Central
Surety f5 Insurance Company, 24 N.W. 2d 809 (Iowa
1946) (Objection to testimony of declaration based on
conclusion, overruled; objection based on hearsay, held,
not presented on appeal); Thornton v. Bench, 360 P. 2d
1065 (Kansas 1961) (Plaintiff objected to admission of
exhibit solely on ground of irrelevancy; plantiff's contention on appeal that the exhibit was hearsay, not considered); Kagan v. Levenson, 134 N.E. 2d 415 (Massachusetts 1956) (Having stated specifically the basis of
their objection, the defendants, in fairness ought not to
be permitted to urge other grounds in this court) ; Teesdale v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 357 P.2d 4 (Montana 1960)
(Hearsay objection not raised at trial, unavailable on appeal); Jimison v. Frank L. McGuire, Inc., 355 P.2d 222
(Oregon 1960) (specific objection on appeal not presented to trial judge, not available); Dobb v. Perry, 145
S.W. 2d 1103 (Texas 1940) (A specific objection which
has been overruled will be effective as a ground of complaint on appeal only to the extent of the grounds named)·
An examination of the record shows that plaintiff's
objections were properly overruled.
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Q.

(Mr. Nebeker) Give us your judgment.

Mr. Beesley: Make the same objection, your Honor.
The Court: Let's find out if he has a judgment or giving an
opinion. If he is giving an opinion, he can't.
Q. Do you have a judgment as to where the point of impact occurred?
A. Yes.

Q. Will you tell us what that judgment is?
Mr. Beesley: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: It's overruled. He may give his judgment.
A. As near the centerline and probably a little bit west.

Mr. Beesley: I object to any Probability, your Honor.
The Court: If you are confining it to your judgmentQ. Just give us our best judgment.
The Court: You can tell us your judgment.

Mr. Beesley: I believe he said the centerline.
A. Near the centerline.

Q. Was it on the west or the east of the centerline?
A. Do I have to answer that "Yes" or "No?"

Q. Yes.
A. My opinion is no good?
Q. Just give us your judgment.
The Court: You can give your judgment, Sergeant.
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A. My judgment, slightly to the west of the centerline.

Q. Would you say it was about a foot to the west of the
centerline?

A. I think that would be a fair figure.
Q. It could have been a little further west? It could have
been a little further east?

A. Yes (R. 183-184)

Plaintiff's general objection is obviously defective.
One of the cardinal rules of evidence is that a general objection, if overruled, cannot avail the objector on appeal.
See Wigmore Vol. I Sec. 18.
This court has held that a general objection which
does not point out the ground upon which it is made,
does not merit consideration.
In Culmer v. Clift, 14 Utah 286, 291, 47 Pac. 85
(1896) this court held that a general objection overruled
did not merit consideration on appeal.
"The objection did not point out the ground
upon which it was made, and therefore does not
merit consideration. The point of the objection
should have been particularly stated, in order to
entitle it to consideration. This is the uniform rule.

General objections to the admission of evidence are
unavailable to the party making them, either on
motion for new trial or appeal. The particular
grounds of the objection must be stated, so that
the trial court may understand the nature of the
objection before passing upon it." (Italics ours)
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The rule announced in the Clift case supra was cited
with approval in In Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106,
297 P. 2d 542 ( 1956) where this court said:
"It is further to be noted that the only objec.
t10n proponent made to the hypothetical question
at the trial was the generalized one that it misstated testatrix' phsyical condition, and that it did
not include some known factors, without specifying what the claimed defects were. The rule is that
in order to preserve the objection for review on
appeal the objector must point out specifically
what she claims was erroneously included or
omitted, which proponent failed to do." (Italics
ours)
Plaintiff's objection to the patrolman's testimony was
on the specific ground of "opinion" and "probability."
Plaintiff made no objection on the ground of lack of
proper foundation. Neither the trial judge nor defendant's
attorney were given an opportunity to remove the objection. The objection to "any opinion" did not raise the
question of lack of foundation. It did raise the question
of whether or not point of impact was a proper subject
for opinion testimony. That was a specific objection which
this court has now held was untenable. This court has in
effect ruled that the objection which plaintiff made at the
trial is without merit but that an entirely different objection, that of lack of proper foundation, is well founded.
It is respectfully submitted that it is manifestly unfair to
this defendant and the trial judge for this court to hold
that the specific objection which was made, was properly
overruled, but an objection which was not made, should
have been sustained.
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Plaintiff waived her objection to the patrolman's
testimony on the ground no Proper foundation had been
laid.
This court has by its decision in the instant case, overruled the Obradovich case supra, Culmer v. Clift supra
and In Re Richards Estate supra. The opinion in the instant case completely ignores the established rules regarding
objections. If the defendant should be required to lay a
proper foundation for an opinion, the plaintiff should be
required to make the proper objection. It is respectfully
submitted that this court should grant a rehearing to permit argument on this matter.
POINT II.
THE PATROLMAN'S TESTIMONY ON POINT
OF IMPACT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Patrolman Sherwood's testimony on the point of impact was cumulative evidence. Both Henry Kelly and
his son Robert Kelly testified the impact occurred on the
west (defendant's) side of the highway.
Henry Kelly stated:
A. (Mr. Kelly) Well, I am positive that the Chevrolet
truck was no less than one half of its--of the entire width
was across on the west side. Now, I am positive of that,
at least of that much. (R 33)
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Robert Kelly testified:

Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Do you have a judgment as to how
far west of the center line the point of impact was between the truck and the Greenbriar?
A.

(Robert Kelly) I would say about half way.

Q. Half ofA. Half of theQ. Width of the car?
A. Half of the width of the road. (R 384)

There is no question about the admissibility of the
testimony of Henry Kelly and Robert Kelly. They were
both eye witnesses to the accident. Since that evidence was
properly received, the only effect of the Patrolman's testimony was cumulative. The erroneous admission of evidence will not be considered reversible error where the
only effect of the evidence is cumulative.

"The erroneous admission of evidence will not
be considered reversible error by the appellate court
where the only effect of the evidence is cumulative
to evidence properly received or facts admitted by
the appellant. And the erroneous admission of evidence becomes immaterial if the point involved has
been proved by adequate and direct testimony or
where it adds little if anything to the facts otherwise established in the record, particularly where
the facts otherwise established amply justify the
factual and legal conclusions of the court. * * *"
5 Am Jur 2d Sec. 800, p. 241. (Italics ours)
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See 5A C.J.S. Sec. 17 3 ( b) page 1018 ; Schofield v.
Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d
342 ( 1934) (Holding erroneous admission of evidence will
not be considered reversible error when the effect of the
evidence is cumulative) .

It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of the
patrolman could not possibly have been prejudicial in view
of the affirmative testimony of the Kellys.

In Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines 232 P.2d 572

(Cal. 1951) when an officer's opinion on point of impact
was admitted the court held it could not have been prejudicial stating:
"Appellants argue the question of the admissibility of Edward's (police officer) opinion as if it
were the most vital evidence in the case. They
greatly overemphasize and exaggerate its importance. Edwards had testified, as did several other
witnesses, as to what he observed at the scene of the
accident. On direct examination he gave the reasons upon which his opinion was predicated. Eye
witnesses testified as to the point of impact. Two
other officers, at least equally competent, gave
contrary opinions based upon the same facts. The
jury had all this evidence before it. Under these
circumstar.ces, assuming that it was error to permit
Edwards to give his opinion as to the point of impact, such error could not have been prejudicial.
The transcript in this case covers some 1620 pages.
A great deal of this record is devoted to the issue of
where and how the collision occurred. The case was
hotly contested and well tried on both sides. During
such a trial it would be a rare occurrence indeed

if some error in the admission or exclusion of evidence did not occur. * * * After reading this record we are convinced that Edwards' testimony,
whether rightfully or wrongfully admitted, played
a very minor part in the ultimate determination
of the case. (Italics ours)
The testimony of patrolman Sherwood played a very
minor role in the ultimate determination of this case. It
is particularly true in view of the patrolman's voluntary
statement that his opinion was "no good." (R. 184)
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THERE
WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT
THE TESTIMONY OF PATROLMAN SHERWOOD.
This court held in the instant case that a trial judge,
in his discretion, may permit a qualified expert to give his
opinion as to the point of a collision when a proper foundation for the opinion has been laid.
Sherwood's qualifications as an expert in accident
investigations were not questioned. A review of Sherwood's testimony shows there is ample evidence to support
his opinion as to the point of impact.

Sherwood was standing less than ten feet from the
accident when it happened.

Q. (Mr. Beesley) Do you have an opinion as to how far
from the center of the road you were standing?
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A.

(Patrolman Sherwood) About ten feet. (R 179)

Sherwood's attention was drawn to the impact by the
noise being so close to him.

Q. (Mr. Beesley) What was the first thing that occurred
that drew your attention that an accident had happened?

A. (Patrolman Sherwood) The noise of the impact being
so close to me. (R 177)

Sherwood was practically an eye witness to the collision as he turned in less than a second and saw the Davis
vehicle take off down the pavement, skid and then roll
over one complete turn.

Q. (Mr. Beesley) All right. Would you describe the sequence of events after you heard the noise?

A. (Patrolman Sherwood) The noise was more to my
rear and to my right, so I just turned to the right and saw
this Davies vehicle taking off down the pavement on the
right or east side of the highway and it travelled some
distance, and then it turned sideways and skidded and then
rolled one complete turn. (R 177, 178)
Sherwood went to the drawing board and drew the
skid marks left by the Davies vehicle after the impact,
the position of the Davies vehicle when he first saw it,
where the Davies vehicle came to rest, where he was standing on the highway, where the other vehicles were on the
highway and where the patrol car was located. (R 178,
179)

Sherwood measured the distance from the point of
impact to where the Robert's vehicle and the defendant's
vehicle came to rest.
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Q. (Mr. Beesley) Now, where did the Roberts vehicle
come to rest?
A. (Patrolman Sherwood) About three hundred and ten
feet on down the highway from this point that he-the
two of them came together.

Q. Three hundred ten feet down the highway?
A. Yes.

Q. And from what point did you measure three hundred
ten feet?
A. From a point near the center of the highway just back
of where I was standing.

Q. I see. And where did the Mitchell vehicle come to
rest?
A. It went on towards the south about a hundred and
fifty feet from the same point and pulled off on the right
hand side of the road, as the photo will so indicate.

Q. How were these measurements taken?
A. By tape measure. (R 178) (Italics ours)

Sherwood measured the distances to each vehicle from
a point near the center of the highway just back of where
he was standing. The patrolman examined the roadway
where the two vehicles collided.
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) I see. Now, you did examine the roadway where these two vehicles had collided, did you not?
A.

(Patrolman Sherwood) Yes.
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Q. And you found that there was considerable debris
on the road there, did you not?

A. Well, I wouldn't know about the considerable amount,
but there was debris.

Q. From your examination of the road, you made a de-

termination as to the approximate point of impact, did
you not?
A. Yes. (R 182)

The patrolman examined the two vehicles involved
in the collision.

Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Did you examine the side of the '49

Chevrolet to determine what damage had been done to it?
A.

(Patrolman Sherwood) Yes.

Q. Well, first of all, let me ask you if you saw the Roberts
car or the Davies car-I believe it was owned by Mr.
Davies, was it not?
A. Yes.

Q. And driven by Mr. Roberts. Did that car make a
complete roll-over?
A. Yes.

Q. And was it damaged on all sides?
A. It was pretty well damaged on both sides and the top
and the windshield because it made one complete roll.

Q. Was the windshield cracked, split?
A. I am sure it was. I can't be positive at this time.
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Q. Did you ever see the Corvair driven by Mr. Mitchell
after the impact occured?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you examine that car?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you tell us what damage appeared to be on the
Corvair?
A. It was scraped pretty well from the-the entire left
side of the body, tearing off some of the chrome molding
and gouging it rather deeply. I don't believe there was any
place that it went clear through the body, but it scraped
the paint off the full length of it. (R 185)

Sherwood had a conversation with Mr. Roberts after
the accident happened.
Q. What did Mr. Roberts say when you asked him
whether he had seen the lights of the officer's car?
A. He said he didn't see them.
Q. Did you ask him if he realized that there had been an
accident there?
MR. BEESLEY: Same objection.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may
answer.
A. I am sure I did.

Q. What did he answer?
A. He said he didn't see any of them.

18

Q. Didn't see anything?
A. I'm not sure if that is the words he used, but basically
that was his answer. (R 188)
Sherwood also examined the photographs of the accident scene taken by Sheriff Jackson to refresh his memory
as to the collision. (R 175)
A review of all of the patrolman's testimony clearly
shows the trail court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the patrolman to testify as to the point of impact.
This is particularly true in view of the fact no objection
was made to the patrolman's testimony on the ground a
proper foundation had not been laid. This court has previously held that a trial court must be allowe.d a considerable latitude of discretion when confronted with the
question of admissibility of expert opinion testimony.
See Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d
275, 342 P. 2d 1094 (1959); Joseph v. W. H. Groves
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330
(1957).
When a trial judge, in the use of his discretion, has
permitted an expert to state his opinion, the decision of the
trial judge should be sustained unless it clearly appears that
he was in error in his judgment. The record in the instant
case affirmatively shows that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion, but properly permitted the patrolman to
state his opinion as to the point of impact.

CONCLUSION
This court has held that a specific objection to opin-.
ion testimony was properly overruled but that an objection which was never made should have been sustained. In
all fairness and justice defendant and the trial court should
have been given an opportunity to correct the alleged
error. This court has previously held that a specific objection is only good on the ground stated. The objection
to "any opinion" did not raise the question of foundation.
The objection was based on the theory that the opinion
went to the very issue to be decided by the jury. This
court has previously held that such an objection is without
merit. The trial court properly overruled the objection to
"any opinion" and permitted the patrolman to testify on
the point of impact to help the jury determine what
happened.
The patrolman's testimony on point of impact was
not prejudicial in view of the eye witness testimony of
Henry Kelly and Robert Kelly. The testimony of the
patrolman was only cumulative, and if its admission was
error, it was not prejudicial.
A full review of Sherwood's testimony clearly shows
there was abundant evidence to support his opinion. The
record shows that Sherwood heard the sound of the collision, saw one of the vehicles immediately after impact as it
careened down the highway, saw the skid marks left by the
plaintiff's vehicle, examined the debris on the road, examined the vehicles, talked to the driver of the plaintiff's
vehicle, made measurements and placed all the information
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on a drawing board before the jury. All these facts, when
considered together, clearly show the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting the patrolman to testify
on the point of impact.
For the foregoing reasons defendant earnestly requests
this court to grant a rehearing.
Respectfully Submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Stephen B. Nebeker
Attorneys for Petitioners

